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Abstract
This paper studies the e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring on the level and skill composition of
domestic employment, using a rich data set of Italian ￿rms and propensity score match-
ing techniques. The results show that service o⁄shoring has no e⁄ect on the level of
employment but changes its composition in favor of high skilled workers.
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The rapid improvements in information and communication technologies occurred over the last
decade have reduced the cost of trading services across national borders and have allowed ￿rms
located in developed countries to transfer abroad an increasing number of service activities
(service o⁄shoring). The potential consequences of this new phenomenon for the level and
skill composition of domestic employment have been extensively debated in the media (see
Mankiw and Swagel, 2006, for a summary) and have become the object of a rapidly growing
number of empirical studies (see Crin￿, 2009a, for a review). So far, the literature suggests
that service o⁄shoring has small e⁄ects on the level of domestic employment (see, e.g., Amiti
and Wei, 2005; and Liu and Tre￿ er, 2008) but changes its composition in favor of high skilled
workers (see, e.g., Geishecker and G￿rg, 2008; and Crin￿, 2009b). Such e⁄ects re￿ ect the
fact that the developed countries o⁄shore low skill-intensive services and specialize in more
complex tasks, so that low skilled jobs are replaced by high skilled jobs with little change in
total employment.
Three important limitations imposed by data constraints, however, have plagued most of
the empirical research so far. In particular, the existing studies were generally forced to: (1)
limit the analysis to aggregate industries (G￿rg and Hanley, 2005, being a relevant exception);
(2) use o⁄shoring proxies estimated under restrictive assumptions; and (3) employ empirical
models based on strong functional-form restrictions. This paper aims to overcome these limi-
tations and to provide new empirical evidence on the employment e⁄ects of service o⁄shoring.
To this purpose, it takes advantage of a large and rich data set of Italian ￿rms including in-
formation on service o⁄shoring and uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques, which
require no functional-form assumptions.
In implementing PSM, the paper explicitly deals with the possibility that service o⁄shoring
(the treatment) and level and skill composition of employment (the outcomes) be jointly
in￿ uenced not only by ￿ observable￿ , but also by ￿ unobservable￿characteristics. To the best
of our knowledge, this is one of the few studies accounting for unobservable factors when
using PSM to investigate the employment e⁄ects of international-trade-related phenomena.
2A notable exception is the work by Becker and Muendler (2008) on the e⁄ects of foreign
employment expansions by German multinational ￿rms.
The results con￿rm that service o⁄shoring has no e⁄ect on total employment but changes
its composition in favor of high skilled workers. Because they are based on service o⁄shoring
information at the ￿rm-level and on a di⁄erent and more general approach, these ￿ndings
strengthen and generalize the main conclusions of previous research.
2 Data
The data come from the 9th ￿ Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere￿ , the most recent wave of a
large survey of Italian ￿rms administered every three years by the commercial bank Unicredit-
Capitalia. The survey collects information on internationalization activities, investment, R&D
and characteristics of the workforce. The 9th wave was carried out in 2003. Some of the
questions were only asked for that year, whereas others were asked either for all the years
since 2001 or cumulatively for the period 2001-2003. Balance sheet data available continuously
since 2001 complement the survey questions. The original sample consists of 4,111 ￿rms and
is strati￿ed by size class, geographic area and industry to be representative of the enterprises
with more than 10 employees. After dropping ￿rms with missing values for the variables of
interest, the ￿nal estimation sample includes 3,079 ￿rms.
Unlike the previous waves, the 9th contains questions on service o⁄shoring; they refer to the
activities carried out in 2003.1 In particular, ￿rms are asked whether they purchased services
from abroad (Amiti and Wei, 2005) in that year, and the types of services they imported.
Two treatment indicators are constructed from these questions: the variable SOS taking a
value of 1 if the ￿rm o⁄shored any types of services, and the variable SOSBUS taking a value
of 1 only if the ￿rm o⁄shored business services.2 Treated ￿rms are 516 in the ￿rst case and
287 in the second; control (non-o⁄shoring) ￿rms are always 2,563. The outcome variables are
the (log) number of employees and the share of workers with a college degree at the end of
1The previous waves, instead, included questions on production o⁄shoring, whose employment e⁄ects are
studied by Antonietti and Antonioli (2007).
2The di⁄erence between SOS and SOSBUS is represented by ￿rms o⁄shoring transportation services only.
32003.
Panel a) of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the outcomes by o⁄shoring status.
The o⁄shoring ￿rms have both higher employment and a more skilled workforce compared
with the non-o⁄shoring ￿rms. As shown in panel b), however, the o⁄shoring ￿rms do not
constitute a random sample because, before treatment, they di⁄ered from the non-o⁄shoring
￿rms along many observable characteristics. Because the latter may have jointly in￿ uenced
the subsequent o⁄shoring decision and the outcomes of these ￿rms, any causal inference based
on the simple comparison of the outcomes by o⁄shoring status is invalid. PSM eliminates this
bias by comparing o⁄shoring and non-o⁄shoring ￿rms that are equivalent in terms of pre-
treatment observable characteristics. The next section presents PSM and sketches the main
idea beyond a sensitivity analysis for the cases in which unobservable characteristics, too,
in￿ uence service o⁄shoring and the outcomes.
3 Empirical Strategy
Let i = 1;:::;N(￿ NT + NC) index ￿rms, where NT and NC are the numbers of treated and
control units, respectively. Also, let Ti = f0;1g indicate the treatment status of each ￿rm.
(In this paper, Ti = 1 if the i-th ￿rm o⁄shores services and Ti = 0 otherwise.) Finally, de￿ne
with Y1;i and Y0;i the potential outcomes of ￿rm i with and without treatment, respectively.
The Average Treatment e⁄ect on Treated ￿rms (ATT) is:
ATT ￿ E(Y1;i ￿ Y0;i j Ti = 1) = E(Y1;i j Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y0;i j Ti = 1).
While E(Y1;i j Ti = 1) is observed, E(Y0;i j Ti = 1) is not, because the same ￿rm cannot be in
both treatment statuses at the same time. However, E(Y0;i j Ti = 1) can be estimated from
the outcomes of control ￿rms under the following identifying assumptions:
1. Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): Y0;i ? Ti j Xi;
2. Common Support Assumption: Pr(Ti = 1 j Xi) < 1.
4CIA states that, conditional on the vector of covariates Xi, the potential outcomes in the
absence of treatment are independent of treatment status, as if treatment were randomized:
conditioning on Xi, therefore, accounts for all of the factors a⁄ecting treatment and outcomes
at the same time. The missing information E(Y0;i j Ti = 1) can then be imputed by matching
each treated ￿rm to the control ￿rms with the same values of Xi and using the outcomes of
the matched ￿rms as estimates. The Common Support Assumption ensures that there exist
both treated and control ￿rms with the same Xi.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), in this paper ￿rms are matched not on Xi directly,
but on the propensity score, p(Xi). This is de￿ned as the probability of receiving treatment
given Xi, i.e. p(Xi) ￿ Pr(Ti = 1 j Xi), and is estimated by logit. Single nearest-neighbor
matching with replacement is then used to pair each treated ￿rm to the control ￿rm with
the closest value of the estimated propensity score. The ATT is computed as the average















where NCm(k) is the number of control ￿rms (j) matched to the k-th treated ￿rm.3
If treatment and outcomes are also in￿ uenced by unobservable characteristics, then CIA
fails and the ATT￿ s are biased. The size of the bias depends on the strength of the correlation
between the unobservable factors, on the one hand, and treatment and outcomes, on the other.
The main idea beyond a sensitivity analysis is to study whether the baseline results obtained
under CIA would substantially change, or even overturn, if this assumption were violated.
Ichino et al. (2008) assume that CIA is violated by an unobserved variable (￿ confounder￿ ),
and propose to simulate it in the data and use it together with Xi to re-estimate p(Xi) and
to compute a new ATT. Comparing the ATT￿ s estimated with and without the confounder
yields an indication of how the results would change if CIA were violated. The confounder
can be simulated to match the distribution of di⁄erent relevant variables, thereby allowing
3NCm(k) = 1, unless there is more than one control ￿rm with the same value of the estimated propensity
score.
5one to assess the implications of di⁄erent sources of violation.
In sum, PSM will compare the level and skill composition of employment in the o⁄shoring
￿rms with those in a subsample of non-o⁄shoring ￿rms as similar as possible in terms of
observable characteristics. The outcomes of the matched ￿rms will be used to estimate those
of the o⁄shoring ￿rms in the unobservable counterfactual scenario in which they have not en-
gaged in service o⁄shoring. This approach relies on the assumption that ￿rms￿selection into
o⁄shoring is entirely determined by observable characteristics (CIA): in this case, conditioning
on the observed covariates makes service o⁄shoring resemble a randomized treatment. CIA
fails, however, if unobservable factors such as a favorable productivity shock in 2003 simulta-
neously lead ￿rms to engage in service o⁄shoring and to change level and skill composition of
their workforce. The sensitivity analysis will verify that such unobservable confounders are
not strong enough to explain the entire di⁄erence in outcomes between the matched groups
of ￿rms.
4 Results
The matching is implemented for four speci￿cations of the propensity score, each estimated for
both treatment indicators. The ￿rst speci￿cation only conditions on the ￿ structural variables￿
listed in panel b1) of Table 1, the second adds the ￿ training, investment and technology
variables￿in panel b2), the third further adds the ￿ internationalization variables￿in panel
b3), and the fourth also controls for lagged import penetration (the ratio of imports over
apparent consumption in 2002) at the level of 2-digit NACE industries; all the covariates
enter linearly in all the speci￿cations. The common support restriction is implemented by
deleting the o⁄shoring ￿rms whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower
than the minimum propensity score of the matched non-o⁄shoring ￿rms.4
Covariate balancing tests reported in the web appendix5 show that the matching is e⁄ec-
tive in removing di⁄erences in observable characteristics between o⁄shoring and non-o⁄shoring
4Estimation and testing are performed in Stata 10, using the psmatch2 and pscore routines developed by
Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
5Available at http://crino.iae-csic.org.
6￿rms. In particular, the median absolute bias is reduced by 72-91% depending on the treat-
ment and speci￿cation of the propensity score. The Pseudo-R2 after matching is always close
to zero, correctly suggesting that the covariates have no explanatory power for predicting
service o⁄shoring in the matched samples. Also, the number of o⁄shoring ￿rms outside the
common support is fairly small, ranging from 1 to 11.
Table 2 reports the estimated ATT￿ s with analytical standard errors. For comparison, it
also reports OLS estimates from regressions of the outcomes on a constant and the treatments.
Panel a) refers to total employment. Note that, although OLS con￿rm that the o⁄shoring
￿rms have higher employment, all the ATT￿ s are small and statistically insigni￿cant. Hence,
service o⁄shoring has no causal e⁄ect on the level of domestic employment: the unconditional
di⁄erence between the two groups of ￿rms vanishes out once observed covariates are controlled
for.
Service o⁄shoring does play an important role, instead, in changing the composition of
employment in favor of high skilled workers. The ATT￿ s reported in panel b), in fact, are
all positive and very precisely estimated, and their point estimates suggest that the e⁄ects of
service o⁄shoring are economically large. For instance, the results for the fourth speci￿cation
of the propensity score show that overall service o⁄shoring (SOS) raises the share of col-
lege graduates by 1.8 percentage points, i.e. by three-fourths of the unconditional di⁄erence
between o⁄shoring and non-o⁄shoring ￿rms detected by OLS.
Sensitivity checks reported in the web appendix show that these results are robust to: (1)
the use of alternative matching estimators (i.e., single nearest-neighbor without replacement in
both ascending and descending order, multiple nearest-neighbor with 10 matches, radius with
1% caliper, epanechnikov kernel with 0.06 bandwidth); (2) the use of trimming (1% caliper)
as an alternative procedure to impose the common support restriction; (3) the inclusion of
controls for lagged outcomes (i.e., log employment and shares of white-collar and R&D workers
in 2002) in the speci￿cation of the propensity score.
Table 3 investigates to what extent the results depend on unobservable characteristics
correlated with service o⁄shoring and the outcomes. To this purpose, the ATT￿ s are re-
7estimated using simulated confounders with the same empirical distribution as the ￿rm-level
covariates reported in Table 1. To save space, only the results for the fourth (and richest)
speci￿cation of the propensity score are reported.6 Starting from total employment in panel
a), note that the ATT￿ s are all small and statistically insigni￿cant. This is not surprising,
indeed, given that the baseline ATT￿ s were already imprecisely estimated. Turning to the
share of college graduates in panel b), note that the ATT￿ s are all positive and precisely
estimated, although their values are systematically lower than in Table 2. This suggests that
unobservable characteristics bias the baseline estimates upward: for instance, a confounder
behaving like labor productivity would account for 0.7 percentage points (i.e., 0.18 - 0.11) of
the baseline ATT of SOS. Importantly, however, none of the confounders are strong enough
to overturn the main results: indeed, the strongest unobservable factor simulated in Table 3
would still leave SOS explain more than one-third (0.9 percentage points) of the unconditional
di⁄erence between o⁄shoring and non-o⁄shoring ￿rms.
5 Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest that service o⁄shoring may have relevant compositional
e⁄ects even within individual ￿rms, and that these e⁄ects favor high skilled workers. Hence,
improved access to higher education and on-the-job training programs may represent e⁄ective
measures to mitigate the adjustment costs in developed countries.
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B, where S is the number of simulations, se
2
W is the average
variance of the ATT across all the simulations, and se
2
B is the average deviation of the ATT from its mean.
8The usual disclaimer applies.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Firms: Control (NC = 2,563)  Treated (NT = 516)     Treated (NT = 287)  
Treatment: -   SOS     SOSBUS 
               
  Mean Std.  Dev.    Mean Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev. 
                       
               
a) Outcomes               
               
      Log Employment, 2003  3.776  0.911    4.353  1.063    4.508  1.125 
      Share of College Graduates, 2003  0.047  0.069    0.072  0.084    0.085  0.098 
               
b) Pre-Treatment Characteristics               
               
      b1) Structural Variables               
               
      Log Output, 2002  15.907  1.135    16.661  1.199    16.819  1.233 
      Log Average Wage, 2002  10.271  0.492    10.347  0.594    10.396  0.543 
      Log Value Added per Worker, 2002  11.404  0.655    11.534  0.714    11.546  0.677 
      Log Inputs per Worker, 2002  11.299  1.071    11.584  1.001    11.581  0.952 
      Log Capital per Worker, 2002  10.201  1.188    10.397  1.238    10.346  1.304 
      Share of Workers with Fixed-Term Contracts, 2002  0.037  0.119    0.040  0.106    0.035  0.085 
      Indicator: Quoted on the Stock Market  0.008  0.088    0.016  0.124    0.017  0.131 
      Indicator: Belongs to a Group  0.243  0.429    0.440  0.497    0.467  0.500 
      Indicator: Credit Constrained  0.139  0.346    0.136  0.343    0.111  0.315 
              
      b2) Training, Investment and Technology Variables              
              
      Share of Workers in Professional Training Courses, 2002  0.045  0.120    0.082  0.171    0.088  0.185 
      R&D / Sales, 2002  0.016  0.327    0.016  0.087    0.015  0.049 
      ICT Share of Total Investment, 2001-2003  0.107  0.184    0.118  0.174    0.117  0.162 
              
      b3) Internationalization Variables              
              
      Indicator: Foreign Direct Investment  0.025  0.155    0.078  0.268    0.070  0.255 
      Indicator: Participated by a Foreign Firm  0.056  0.230    0.151  0.359    0.209  0.407 
      Indicator: Exporter  0.700  0.459    0.926  0.261    0.937  0.243 
      Indicator: Offshored Intermediate Inputs  0.164  0.371    0.252  0.435    0.293  0.456 
Source: Unicredit-Capitalia. The treatment indicator SOS takes a value of 1 if the firm offshored any types of services in 2003. SOSBUS takes a value of 1 only if the firm 
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Table 2 - Baseline Results    
  a) Outcome: Log Employment    b) Outcome: Share of College Graduates 
                    
  ATT    ATT 
 
OLS 
Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4   
OLS 
Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4 
                 
Treatment: SOS 0.577***  0.025  0.028  0.021 -0.026    0.024***  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 
  [0.050] [0.069]  [0.070]  [0.072]  [0.070]    [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Treatment: SOSBUS  0.732***  -0.023  0.002 0.004 -0.070    0.038*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.023***  0.028*** 
    [0.069] [0.093]  [0.096]  [0.092]  [0.093]      [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
OLS estimates are obtained by regressing the outcome on a constant and the treatment. The ATT's are obtained using single nearest-neighbor matching with replacement, for 
four specifications of the propensity score. The common support restriction is implemented by deleting the offshoring firms whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the matched non-offshoring firms. Analytical standard errors are reported in brackets. ***,**,*: indicate 
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Table 3 - Sensitivity Analysis 
Outcome: a) Log Employment     b) Share of College Graduates 
Treatment: SOS SOSBUS   SOS  SOSBUS 
         
Confounder behaving like:         
         
Log Output, 2002  0.019  0.049   0.010** 0.021*** 
  [0.041] [0.049]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Log Average Wage, 2002  0.017 0.029   0.010*** 0.020*** 
  [0.041] [0.051]   [0.003]  [0.005] 
Log Value Added per Worker, 2002 0.018  0.021    0.011*** 0.021*** 
  [0.038] [0.052]   [0.003]  [0.005] 
Log Inputs per Worker, 2002  0.021 0.026   0.011*** 0.021*** 
  [0.042] [0.052]   [0.003]  [0.005] 
Log Capital per Worker, 2002  0.008 0.007   0.012*** 0.023*** 
  [0.038] [0.047]   [0.003]  [0.005] 
Share of Workers with Fixed-Term Contracts, 2002  0.013 0.006   0.012*** 0.023*** 
  [0.038] [0.050]   [0.003]  [0.004] 
Indicator: Quoted on the Stock Market -0.006  -0.007   0.013***  0.025*** 
  [0.034] [0.041]   [0.003]  [0.004] 
Indicator: Belongs to a Group  0.016 0.033   0.009** 0.020*** 
  [0.039] [0.054]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Indicator: Credit Constrained  -0.003 -0.002   0.013*** 0.025*** 
  [0.034] [0.041]   [0.003]  [0.004] 
Share of Workers in Professional Training Courses, 2002  0.016 0.021   0.011*** 0.022*** 
  [0.039] [0.053]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
R&D / Sales, 2002  0.009  0.021    0.011***  0.021*** 
  [0.039] [0.055]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
ICT Share of Total Investment, 2001-2003  0.010  0.008    0.012***  0.022*** 
  [0.038] [0.049]   [0.003]  [0.004] 
Indicator: Foreign Direct Investment 0.002  0.002    0.012*** 0.023*** 
  [0.040] [0.050]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Indicator: Participated by a Foreign Firm  0.008  0.026   0.011***  0.021*** 
  [0.041] [0.059]   [0.004]  [0.006] 
Indicator: Exporter  0.014  0.021   0.010** 0.022*** 
  [0.042] [0.051]   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Indicator: Offshored Intermediate Inputs  0.013  0.018   0.012***  0.023*** 
   [0.039] [0.053]     [0.003]  [0.005] 
Results for the fourth specification of the propensity score. The ATT's are based on 500 simulations of each confounder. The continuous covariates are discretized so that the 
observations above the sample mean take a value of 1. Analytical standard errors are reported in brackets. ***,**,*: indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 